Family Time, “Reasonable Efforts,” and a Colorado Springs Case Now Before the Colorado Supreme Court: What’s at Stake in People in Interest of S.K.F.

The questions the Colorado Supreme Court agreed to consider go to how family-time restrictions are reviewed, how much deference a trial court’s reasonable-efforts finding receives on appeal, and how the family-time statute fits into that analysis.

The Case

In July 2022, the El Paso County Department of Human Services opened a dependency and neglect case involving three children. The petition alleged that the father, R.F., had been physically abusive and that the mother had failed to protect the children. The children were placed in foster care within weeks.

The father asked for family time. The children’s legal representative asked that any contact be therapeutic, supervised and structured by a clinician, and the juvenile court ordered therapeutic family time. Both parents entered no-fault admissions through counsel that the children were neglected, and the court adopted a treatment plan for the father.

The father participated in individual therapy and life-skills services and repeatedly requested contact. Disputes remained concerning other requirements and proposed prerequisites to family time. The caseworker testified that the children’s therapists did not believe the children were ready for contact, and the older children told the caseworker they did not want to see him. The juvenile court found that the Department had made reasonable efforts toward reunification, observing that family time “can only be done when the children are ready.” At that point, the father had had no contact with his children for about a year and a half.

The Department later moved to terminate the father’s parental rights, and the court granted the motion. By then, the father had gone roughly two and a half years without contact.

A Word on Who Represented the Children

Colorado law gives children in dependency and neglect cases a lawyer, but the lawyer’s role depends on the appointment. A guardian ad litem advocates for the child’s best interests as the GAL independently determines them. Counsel for Youth represents the young person’s expressed interests, what the youth actually wants, in the way any attorney represents a client. In this case, the same attorney initially served as GAL for the two younger children and as Counsel for Youth for the oldest; later, she served as GAL for the youngest and Counsel for Youth for the older two. This post refers to her collectively as the children’s legal representative, because the distinction matters when reading what the children’s side asked for and why.

What the Court of Appeals Held

On March 5, 2026, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the termination in an unpublished opinion by Judge Timothy J. Schutz (People in Interest of S.K.F., No. 25CA0206). Because the opinion is unpublished, it does not establish binding precedent for other cases; its significance lies in the questions it raised and the Supreme Court’s decision to take them up. The division identified three problems:

1.     A change in family time without the required hearing. The juvenile court moved family time from supervised to therapeutic without holding the evidentiary hearing the family-time statute, C.R.S. § 19-3-217, requires before such a change. The division treated this as a procedural error on these facts, not as a rule that every initial family-time order demands a prior hearing.

2.     A reasonable-efforts finding that did not match the record. When the juvenile court found reasonable efforts, the father had had no contact for about eighteen months and the Department was not providing therapeutic sessions, though no court order authorized withholding them.

3.     An obligation not fulfilled. The division concluded that, under the existing orders and circumstances, the Department had not fulfilled its obligation to provide appropriate family-time services. Its reasoning emphasized judicial responsibility for restrictions on contact and the inadequacy of leaving contact indefinitely contingent on readiness.

The division also directed further proceedings on a separate issue: the father’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the adjudication stage. Family time was the heart of the opinion, but not its only subject.

What the Supreme Court Agreed to Consider

The People and the guardian ad litem sought Supreme Court review of the appellate ruling. On June 23, 2026, the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari (No. 26SC177) on three issues, two of which it reframed, and denied review on all others. Paraphrased, the questions are:

1.     Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Department restricted family time without a court order and therefore did not make reasonable efforts.

2.     Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the clearly-erroneous standard of review to the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made.

3.     Whether the Court of Appeals erred in treating C.R.S. § 19-3-217 as dispositive of whether reasonable efforts were made.

Granting review is not a ruling that either side is correct. It means the Court considers the questions important enough to answer.

On the second question, the Court of Appeals did not review everything independently. It distinguished the juvenile court’s factual findings, which it reviewed for clear error, from the ultimate determination of whether those facts amount to reasonable efforts, which it reviewed de novo. The Supreme Court will consider how appellate courts should distinguish factual findings entitled to deference from legal conclusions about reasonable efforts, and how compliance with the family-time statute fits into that analysis.

Why It Matters

For parents in D&N cases. A treatment plan is the parent’s path toward reunification, and family time is usually part of it. The Court of Appeals’ reasoning assigns part of the responsibility for contact to the Department and the court, not solely to the parent’s compliance or the children’s readiness. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify how far that responsibility extends.

For children and their legal representatives. The children here, through their representative, asked for therapeutic contact, and the older children later said they did not want to see their father. A GAL must weigh those statements against the child’s long-term interests; Counsel for Youth must advance them. The case raises the question of what a Department must do when children oppose contact and clinicians recommend against it, and how a court should supervise that decision rather than leave it open-ended.

For Departments and caseworkers. The division’s reasoning places weight on judicial responsibility for restrictions. If the Supreme Court adopts that emphasis, a Department that is not providing ordered family time would be expected to bring the question back to the court for a ruling rather than let the restriction continue by default.

For juvenile courts. Reasonable-efforts findings are made at nearly every stage of a D&N case. The deference question determines how closely an appellate court may look behind those findings when a family-time restriction was not itself the subject of a court order. More deference means the trial court’s view of the facts largely controls; less deference means the legal adequacy of the Department’s efforts gets a fresh look on appeal.

The Questions Underneath

The case concerns how courts should protect children’s safety and emotional well-being while ensuring that family-time restrictions receive the judicial review required by law. It also raises questions about what reunification efforts are required when children oppose contact and clinicians recommend against it. The Supreme Court’s review may clarify how those considerations interact with statutory procedures and appellate standards of review.

What to Watch

•     Whether the Court treats § 19-3-217 as creating an enforceable procedural requirement, or as one consideration within the broader reasonable-efforts inquiry.

•     How the Court addresses the distinction between a Department that attempts therapeutic contact and does not succeed, and one that does not begin.

•     Whether the Court says anything about the roles of GALs and Counsel for Youth when a child’s expressed wishes and a parent’s statutory rights point in different directions. It is not among the questions presented, but it runs underneath all three.

•     Timing. The Court granted review in June 2026.

LawTech accepts appointments as Guardian ad Litem, Counsel for Youth, and Child’s Legal Representative in Colorado courts.

This post is for general information only and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. The case discussed is pending, the appellate opinion is unpublished, and the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision may differ from any analysis offered here. Consult an attorney about your specific situation.

SOURCES

People in Interest of S.K.F., Y.Y.F., and A.N.F., No. 25CA0206 (Colo. App. Mar. 5, 2026) (unpublished) (Schutz, J.)

Colorado Supreme Court Case Announcements, June 23, 2026, No. 26SC177 (certiorari granted in part, en banc)

C.R.S. § 19-3-217 (family time in dependency and neglect proceedings); C.R.S. § 19-3-604 (criteria for termination of the parent-child legal relationship)